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A SYMMETRY PROBLEM IN THE COPENHAGEN
INTERPRETATION
I. SCHMELZER
Abstract. A non-uniqueness result for the canonical structure in quantum
theory shows that the classical part of the Copenhagen interpretation con-
tains physically important information not contained in it’s quantum part. As
a consequence, we cannot compute the symmetry group of a quantum theory
considering only the quantum part. The unavoidable vagueness of the classical
part therefore leads to a similar vagueness in the definition of the symmetry
group. This makes it at least problematic, if not impossible, to establish the
true symmetry group of a quantum theory in the Copenhagen interpretation.
Different from the old measurement problem, the symmetry group is to im-
portant physically to be rejected as a metaphysical pseudoproblem.
1. Introduction
In [12] we have proven a non-uniqueness theorems for the canonical structure:
For some fixed Hamilton operator hˆ, we have constructed for some real parameter
s different pairs qˆ(s), pˆ(s) of canonical operators so that hˆ = 1
2m
pˆ(s)2 + V (qˆ(s), s)
with physically different, but equally nice potentials. Thus, a physically complete
definition of quantum theory cannot derive the correct canonical operators pˆ, qˆ, but
has to define them. Moreover, this cannot be done by pure labeling. At least the
interpretation has to describe what physically distinguishes the correct canonical
operators.
Discussing these consequences in [13], we have found that (different from pure
interpretations like the Everett [3], Ithaca [8] and consistent histories [7] inter-
pretations considered there) the Copenhagen interpretation does not have a non-
uniqueness problem: It is solved by the association of the correct canonical opera-
tors pˆ and qˆ with classically described experimental arrangements for momentum
and configuration measurements. Thus, Copenhagen seems to be among the win-
ners of this non-uniqueness result.
The aim of this paper is to show that, instead, Copenhagen is among the losers.
First, we observe that an old symmetry argument made by Pauli against pilot wave
theory fails now. Digging deaper, we observe that proving symmetry properties of
a quantum theory in the Copenhagen interpretation appears conceptually difficult
if not impossible: Once the classical part of Copenhagen solves the non-uniqueness
problem, it becomes clear that this part contains physically important informa-
tion. Thus, this part cannot be ignored if we consider symmetry properties of the
quantum theory.
But this part is necessarily vague. How can one prove exact symmetry properties
if parts of the definition of the theory are vague? Considering some fallacious ways
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to solve this new symmetry problem, we observe that this problem, as well as the
non-uniqueness problem, share a common structure with the good old measurement
problem: One can shift the quantum-classical boundary, but all one reaches in
this way is that these problems shift together with the boundary. This suggests,
on the one hand, that the new symmetry problem will appear as unsolvable in
the Copenhagen context as the measurement problem. On the other hand, the
problem of identifying the symmetry group cannot be rejected as a metaphysical
pseudoproblem as one can at least try in the case of the measurement problem.
We compare this with the situation in pilot wave and physical collapse theories.
Above variants solve the non-uniqueness problem without the classical Copenhagen
part, based on some additional structure, namely the configuration space Q which
is physically distinguished – by some explicit trajectory or by some modification
of the Schro¨dingerequation. In above cases, this violates relativistic symmetry by
explicit introduction of a preferred frame.
2. The inherent vagueness of an operationalist interpretation
The vagueness of the classical part of the Copenhagen interpretation has been
seen as a weakness. Bell’s rejection of the Copenhagen interpretation as “unprofes-
sionally vague and ambiguous” ([1], p.173) is quite famous, and many attempts to
develop new interpretations of quantum theory have been motivated by the desire
to get rid of this vague part, for example, Mermin “. . . would like to have a quantum
mechanics that does not require the existence of a classical domain” [8].
But the vagueness has been also defended as necessary, in particular by Rosen-
feld. This is in particular interesting here because it illustrates the large amount of
vagueness which has been defended by the Copenhagen camp:
[Everetts] work suffers from the fundamental misunderstanding
which affects all attempts at axiomatizing any part of physics. The
axiomatizers do not realize that every physical theory must neces-
sarily make use of concepts which cannot, in principle, be further
analysed, since they describe the relationship between the physical
system which is the object of study and the means of observation
by which we study it: these concepts are those by which we give
information about the experimental arrangement, enabling anyone
(in principle) to repeat the experiment. It is clear that in the last
resort we must here appeal to common experience as a basis for
common understanding. To try (as Everett does) to include the ex-
perimental arrangement into the theoretical formalism is perfectly
hopeless, since this can only shift, but never remove, this essential
use of unanalysed concepts which alone makes the theory intelligi-
ble and communicable. (Leon Rosenfeld to Saul M. Bergmann, 21
Dec 1959, Rosenfeld Papers, Niels Bohr Archive, Copenhagen, as
quoted by [4])
As a defense of the use of vague “concepts which cannot, in principle, be further
analysed” it clearly fails: Nor the means of observation themself, nor their re-
lationship with the object of the study have to be axiomatized. A fundamental
theory tries to axiomatize only the fundamental constituents themself. The mea-
surement instruments may be extremely complex and remain unanalysed, even if
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they consist of completely axiomatized and analysed constituents. Thus, the Rosen-
feld argument, while unable to defend the vagueness, clarifies that the vagueness
is unavoidable in principle in the operationalist approach, where the experimental
arrangements are part of the definition of the theory.
By most working physicists, the vagueness of the classical part has not been
considered as very problematic. In part because, for all practical purposes, the
physical meaning of the canonical operators was really unproblematic. Then, fol-
lowing the invention of decoherence, it has been widely assumed that the classical
part is not necessary at all, that one can derive it using decoherence techniques.
If that would be true, the argument of this paper would vanish into thin air: To
compute the symmetry group of the theory, it would be sufficient to compute the
symmetry group of it’s certain quantum part, which is essentially what has been
done up to now.
But our non-uniqueness result proves that there is no such derivation, that one
needs additional physical information to identify the correct choices of the canon-
ical operators. In the Copenhagen interpretation, this additional information is
given in the classical part – by the association of the canonical operators pˆ, qˆ with
the experimental arrangement for their measurement. So, once different choices of
pˆ(s), qˆ(s) lead to different physics, the classical part of the Copenhagen interpre-
tation contains physically important information which cannot be derived from it’s
quantum part.
In the light of this observation, the vagueness of the classical part becomes
dangerous. Can one be sure that the important physical information hidden behind
this vagueness is unimportant for the particular physical question considered in a
particular application?
3. The Pauli argument
One (not only) historically important case where the vagueness of the classical
part has been fatal is Pauli’s arguments against the pilot wave interpretation:
. . . to ascribe Ψ(x) physical reality and not to φ(p) destroys a trans-
formation group of the theory. (Pauli to Bohm, 03 Dec 1951, [11],
436-441, as quoted by [4]),
. . . the artificial asymmetry introduced in the treatment of the
two variables of a canonically conjugated pair characterizes this
form of theory as artificial metaphysics. ([10], as quoted by [4]).
What’s wrong with it? Without doubt, there is an asymmetry between momentum
and configuration already in the kinematics of pilot wave theory. But there is no
symmetry between them in the kinematics of the Copenhagen intepretation too:
Explicit experimental arrangements for measuring pˆ and qˆ, whatever they are, will
be quite different from each other, and it is hard to imagine that they will show any
symmetry. Thus, Pauli’s argument is wrong, and it does not seem to be far fetched
to blame the inherent, unavoidible vagueness of the classical part of Copenhagen
for this error.
4. How to establish exact symmetries of vague theories?
This raises an important general problem: Behind the vagueness of the classical
part of Copenhagen, a lot of physically important information may be hidden,
and, as the Pauli precedent shows, in particular information about the symmetries
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of the theory. So the following question appears: How can we become sure that
a Copenhagen quantum theory has some certain, exact symmetry? Obviously one
also has to check if the experimental arrangements as well as their associations with
operators have this symmetry too. But these associations are only vaguely defined.
This is fatal for proving exact symmetry properties: If there is no exact description
of the experimental arrangement, one cannot prove that the whole theory is really
symmetric.
We would not claim that it is completely impossible to argue in favour of some
symmetry if the theory is vague: In particular, one can make a good case for
translational symmetries even in vague theories, simply because the meaning of
our words implicitly incorporates the assumption of some translational symmetry.
Nonetheless, even in this case this would be no more than a plausibility argument
and not a proof: A vague description could describe a crystal as having continuous
translational symmetry, while it’s atomic structure has only a discrete translational
symmetry. A proof would have to rely on an exact description.
If one thinks about possibilities to solve this problems, there seem to be two
strategies: On the one hand, one can think that one should describe the classical
part using classical physics, which would allow to prove that the measurement
device follows exactly classical symmetries. On the other hand, one can think
about the description of the particular experimental arrangement or at least some
important part of it as being described by the quantum part, so that one can use the
symmetries of the pure quantum part to prove that the experimental arrangement
has the particular symmetry. Above strategies fail.
The failure of the former strategy is quite obvious – given that we know that
quantum theory is true, classical theory cannot be exact, but only an approxima-
tion. But one cannot make conclusions about exact symmetry properties based on
the classical approximation. The failure of the latter strategy is more interesting.
5. Why shifting the boundary does not solve the problem
Desribing the measurement device or some part of it with quantum mechanics
only shifts the boundary between classical and quantum part of the Copenhagen
interpretation. Now, restricting the consideration to the quantum part fails, for
the same reason pure quantum theory fails – the classical part contains important
physical information, and this information cannot be obtained from the pure quan-
tum theory of some part of the world, however large. Instead, this pure quantum
theory needs a further, shifted classical-quantum boundary to become physically
well-defined.
It is the advantage of our non-uniqueness result that it allows to make this point
certain and unquestionable: We can solve the non-uniqueness problem with Copen-
hagen only if we rely on some connection with some experimental arrangement, and
no shift of the boundary can solve this problem: We always have to rely on some
association with some external experimental arrangement, however far it has been
shifted. And this association always has physical importance, because the different
choices of pˆ and qˆ define different physics. And, as a consequence, the consideration
of the symmetries of the theory is also not complete without the consideration of
the next classical-quantum boundary.
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6. Three problems showing the same pattern
This is the same problem pattern we already know from the measurement prob-
lem: We can shift the boundary, but to solve the measurement problem we always
have to rely on the (however far shifted) boundary. Thus, we have now already
three problems which share this same pattern – that we can shift the boundary as
we like, but to solve these problems we have to take into account the boundary.
Up to now, only one of them, the measurement problem, has been recognized.
While it has been considered as important by many of those who have studied the
foundations of quantum theory, there have been also lot’s of attempts to reject it as
a metaphysical pseudoproblem. This is not the place to evaluate these arguments:
Instead, our point is that we can now forget about them, because the new symmetry
problem doesn’t look like metaphysical a pseudo-problem.
The non-uniqueness problem is certainly not metaphysical: The physical differ-
ences between the hˆ = 1
2m
pˆ(s)2 + V (qˆ(s), s) are far to obvious to ignore them. Of
course, it does not have explicit consequences for physics as we do them: The canon-
ical way to define quantum theory has always fixed some operators pˆ and qˆ and
assigned them a physical meaning, thus, the “shut up and calculate” interpretation
works as usual. It’s importance is of different character: It proves that physically
important information is contained in the classical-quantum boundary, informa-
tion which is not contained in the quantum part taken alone, however large. And
this is the key observation which makes the computation of the symmetry group
problematic.
The symmetry of a physical theory is of central importance in modern physics.
One can possibly argue that it’s importance is overestimated, but it is hard to
deny completely it’s physical importance. Thus, we obtain a new, strong physical
argument against the Copenhagen interpretation:
The vagueness of the classical part of the Copenhagen interpretation
prevents the exact computation of the symmetry group of the theory.
An interpretation which prevents, because of it’s inherent vagueness, the computa-
tion of the exact symmetry group of a theory seems to be in deep trouble.
It would be in deep trouble even if there would be no alternatives. But there are
alternatives: Pilot wave theories [2] allow to derive, in quantum equilibrium, the
physical predictions of quantum theory. They also allow to solve the non-uniqueness
problem. On the other hand, they do not have any vague classical parts like the
Copenhagen interpretation. Everything is exactly defined, and there is no problem
with computing the symmetry group of these theories. Similarly, physical collapse
theories [6, 5] are also well-defined, without reference to measurement devices, and
also have no symmetry problem. Given such alternatives, what could justify a
preference of an interpretation whose vagueness forbids even the computation of
the symmetry group?
7. Discussion: Does quantum theory require a preferred frame?
The interpretations we consider as the winners of our non-uniqueness problem –
pilot wave and physical collapse theories – share an important property: As realistic
interpretations, they need a preferred frame. Does this strengthen the case for a
preferred frame? It seems. The pure interpretations we have to rejected as not
viable in [13] have to be completed by some yet unknown additional structure,
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which, on the one hand, allows to prefer one qˆ among the qˆ(s) but, on the other
hand, do not need for this purpose a preferred frame. This is not trivial, given
that a configuration is a frame-dependent notion. In particular, in the many worlds
context Wallace has noted that “. . . there seems to be no relativistically covariant
way to define a world . . . ” [15].
But while the currently pure interpretations may be saved by adding some appro-
priate structure, there seems no such way to save the Copenhagen interpretation:
Once it is recognized (because of the non-uniqueness problem) that the classical
part contains nontrivial physical information, and as long as this classical part re-
mains vague, there seems no way to find out the true symmetry group of a quantum
theory in this interpretation.
Thus, it seems, those who consider Lorentz symmetry as fundamental are now
faced with a foundational problem: To find an interpretation of quantum theory
which does not have a non-uniqueness problem, is not vague so that it does allow to
compute the exact symmetry group of the theory, but does not require a preferred
frame.
In our opinion, there is no need to search for such interpretations. It would have
to reject the already extremely weak notion of realism which one needs to prove
Bell’s inequalities. Moreover, the preferred frame is not only something negative
– it also opens new ways: In particular, in [14] we have proposed a simple con-
densed matter interpretation for the standard model of particle physics as well as
for relativistic gravity. The standard model interpretation contains lot’s of impor-
tant parts incompatible with a four-dimensional approach, in particular because
the number of colors, the number of generations, and the number of generators of
the weak group (among others) are associated with the dimension of space. These
interesting possibilities are lost if we require fundamental Lorentz symmetry.
Thus, we see no good reason to bother too much about the loss of Lorentz
symmetry on the fundamental level. Therefore, the existing realistic interpretations
are a satisfactory way to solve the non-uniqueness problem. We prefer the de
Broglie-Bohm pilot wave interpretation, because of it’s mathematical beauty and
because of the identity of it’s predictions with standard “shut up and calculate”
quantum theory.
Others may think that a loss of Lorentz symmetry is not permissible. They have
to find now an interpretation which, on the one hand, solves the non-uniqueness
problem, on the other hand, is not too vague to prevent the computation of the
symmetry group. The existing pure interpretations are a good starting point, but
need additional structure. Instead, the Copenhagen interpretation seems doomed
– one cannot derive exact symmetries from vague descriptions.
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